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ABSTRACT 
The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and its 
Political-Economy:  Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities 
by Achim Kemmerling and Andreas Stephan 
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the 
contribution of infrastructure accumulation to private production. A political economy 
model for the allocation of public infrastructure investment grants is formulated. Our 
empirical findings, using a panel of large German cities for the years 1980, 1986, and 
1988, suggest that cities ruled by a council sharing the State (Bundesland) 
governments current political affiliation were particularly successful in attracting 
infrastructure investment grants. With regard to the contribution of infrastructure 
accumulation to growth, we find that public capital is a significant factor in private 
production.  Moreover, at least for the sample studied, we find that simultaneity between 
output and public capital is weak; thus, feedback effects from output to infrastructure 
are negligible. 
 
Keywords: Local Infrastructure, Intergovernmental Grants, Productivity  
JEL Classification: D72, D78, O40 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Der Beitrag lokaler öffentlicher Infrastruktur zur privaten Produktivität und seine 
politische Ökonomie:  Empirische Evidenz von einem Paneldatensatz großer 
deutscher Städte 
Dieses Papier verwendet ein simultanes Gleichungssystem zur Schätzung des Beitrags 
von Infrastrukturinvestitionen zu regionalem Wachstum. Ein polit-ökonomisches 
Modell der Al-lokation von Finanzzuweisungen für öffentliche Investitionen in 
Infrastruktur wird formuliert. Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse basierend  auf einem 
Paneldatensatz für große deutsche Städte in den Jahren 1980, 1986 und 1988 deuten 
darauf hin, dass Städte, deren Mehrheit im Stadtrat die selbe politische `Couleur wie 
die Landesregierung hatte, erfolgreicher bei der Zuteilung von Finanzzuweisungen 
waren. Im Hinblick auf den Beitrag der Infrastrukturakkumulation auf das Wachstum 
finden wir, dass öffentliches Kapital ein wichtiger Faktor für die private Produktion ist. 
Weiterhin, zumindest für den untersuchten Zeitraum, finden wir, dass die Si-multanität 
zwischen Output und öffentlichem Kapital gering ist; daher sind Feedback-Effekte von 
Output zur Infrastruktur vernachlässigbar. 
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the role of public capital in private production and provides
empirical evidence on the politico-economic determinants of the allocation of public
infrastructure investments. From this perspective, our study links the literature on
the productivity effects of infrastructure with the literature on the political-economy
of fiscal federalism.
Since Aschauer published an influential series of papers (1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c)
about the effects of public infrastructure investment for long-run growth and pro-
ductivity in the U.S. and other major countries, there has been an on-going de-
bate about the role of public infrastructure in generating national welfare. Aschauer
(1989a), for example, using a production function approach with aggregate time-
series data for the U.S. from 1949 to 1985, found that the elasticity of output with re-
spect to a broadmeasure of public infrastructure was significant and of a remarkable
magnitude. At a time of widespread concern about the slowdown of U.S. produc-
tivity growth in the 1970s and 1980s, this finding suggested that the general decline
in public infrastructure spending in the U.S. since the 1970s could at least partly
explain the observed slowdown in productivity growth.
However, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity of infrastructure capital in
Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1995) and other studies (Garcia-Mila` and McGuire, 1992;
Munnell, 1990a; Munnell, 1990b; Munnell, 1992; Munnell, 1993) is still a matter of
discussion (for an overview, see Gramlich, 1994). The main focus of the so-called
‘infrastructure’ debate is on the interpretation of results and the appropriate empir-
ical methodology (Aaron, 1990; Holtz-Eakin, 1994). For example, it is argued that
the direction of causation is unclear, i.e., whether causality runs from infrastructure
to output or from output to infrastructure (Tatom, 1991; Tatom, 1993). In order to
address the problem of causality econometrically several studies have suggested
simultaneous-equation-approaches with public infrastructure investment as an en-
dogenous variable (e.g., Cadot et al., 1999; Duffy-Deno and Eberts, 1991; de Frutos
and Pereira, 1993).
Similar to Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) or Crihfield and Pangebean (1995), our
study estimates the contribution of public capital to private production at the local
level. This approach seems to be justified by the fact that about 60 percent of pub-
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lic infrastructure is provided by local governments and not by the federal or state
governments (Seitz, 1995).
Infrastructure investments at the municipal level in Germany usually consists of
two parts: autonomous investment and matching investment grants from higher-
tier governments. The increasing weight of investment grants for the realisation
of local investment projects in Germany suggests to model both parts (grants and
autonomous investments) separately within our simultaneous equation approach.
Whereas the former is a matter of decision for the municipal councils, the latter is
predominantly provided by the federal states (‘Bundesla¨nder’).
The literature on the role of fiscal federalism for infrastructure policies so far
has mainly discussed optimal rules for the provision of infrastructure at different
levels of government (e.g., Hulten and Schwab, 1997). However, it remains an open
question whether infrastructure policies are designed in reality according to such
efficiency considerations. Therefore, the main contribution of our paper is that we
empirically shed light on other potential determinants of infrastructure policies and
test them against traditional efficiency arguments.
In this paper we adopt the approaches of Cadot et al. (1999) and Crain and
Oakley (1995) in that we analyse the politics of infrastructure. What we suppose
as politico-economic determinants of local infrastructure investment decisions are
(i) ‘pork-barrel’ infrastructure policies due to the influence of firms on the allocation
of investments (ii) distortions in allocation of intergovernmental infrastructure in-
vestment grants due to the political affiliation of governments at different levels or
(iii) distortions in allocation of investment grants due to the strategical advantage of
heavily contested constituencies (‘swing voter’ approach). All in all, these potential
influences may give rise to outcomes of local infrastructure investment decisions
that might differ substantially from an optimal allocation as a result of maximising
social welfare.
With our empirical model we test these different ideas on a panel data set consist-
ing of 87 German cities for the years 1980, 1986 and 1988. We use a simultaneous-
equations approach to estimate the relationship between infrastructure investments,
investment grants, local manufacturing output, policy and lobbying variables. The
main findings of our analysis are (i) the contribution of local public capital to private
production in cities is positive and significant (ii) political affiliation, measured by
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the coincidence of party colour between state and local government, is decisive in
explaining the distribution of investment grants across cities (iii) cities with a preva-
lence of ‘marginal voters’ neither spend more on public infrastructure nor receive
more investment grants from higher-tier governments (v) the larger the majority
of government in city council the higher the local infrastructure spending (vi) in-
vestment grants do not induce higher autonomous infrastructure spending of cities,
i.e. there is no evidence of a complementary relationship between matching invest-
ment grants and infrastructure spending (vii) efficiency considerations do not seem
to determine the observed intergovernmental grant allocation across cities whereas
redistributive concerns of higher-tier governments matter.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the de-
terminants of local infrastructure policies in Germany. Section 3 elaborates the hy-
potheses and presents the structure of the empirical model. Section 4 describes the
empirical implementation and reports estimation results. Section 5 provides conclu-
sions.
2. Local infrastructure policies in the context of German Fiscal Federalism
German federalism is constitutionally obliged to balance local autonomy and the
uniformity of living conditions throughout the German territory. Humplick and
Moini-Araghi (1996) argue that this often results in a less efficient provision of public
infrastructure. As they put it ‘the equity objective overrides the efficiency objective’
(Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1996: 32). These obligations of German federalism
create the need for a network of horizontal and vertical bargaining institutions that
coordinate the interests of the different governmental levels. Moreover, the German
system of federalism differs from e.g. the U.S. system inasmuch as it fuses spheres
of competence and control as well as the financing of investment. Because of this
feature Germany has been called a ’unitary federal state’ and the way how po-
litical bargaining is done has been characterised as ’intertwined politics’ (Scharpf,
1988; Scharpf, 1999). In the following, we discuss the mechanism of fiscal transfers
and its concomitant political bargaining process for the case of local infrastructure
investments.
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The resources for infrastructure investments in Germany usually consist of mixed
financing between two or more levels of German government. There are two dif-
ferent financial sources for infrastructure investments: autonomous investments by
municipalities, and investment grants provided by other institutions, the central
government (‘Bund’), the states (‘Bundesla¨nder’), the ERP, or horizontal fiscal ex-
change mechanisms. However, the overwhelming part of these funds are adminis-
tered by the state governments. The latter usually allocate funds to local communi-
ties, monitor the implementation process and, where necessary, report to the central
government or the ERP.1 This justifies, in our view, to concentrate on the politico-
economic process of allocating infrastructure investment that takes place between
state and local governments and ignore other levels of fiscal federalism in Germany.
The majority of investment grants from states to municipalities takes the form of
matching funds. Nevertheless, fixed matching ratios between state level grants and
local investments are rarely found, as a result of planning problems and changing
investment costs (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1986).
The procedure of starting a new infrastructure investment project is a complex
arrangement between the local government, which makes proposal in the first stage
of the project planning, and the federal state administration that grants an invest-
ment subsidy. Because of the growing fiscal tension in the local budgets (e.g. Pohlan,
1997), the role of investment subsidies in Germany has risen throughout the 1980s.2
The ratio between investment subsidies from various levels of higher-tier govern-
ments and total local investment in transport infrastructure rose from around 24 per
cent in 1980 to 46 per cent in 1988. The municipalities’ dependency on investment
grants also makes it difficult for them to plan investment projects autonomously.
One reason for this is the overall increase of insecurity in the planning process,
as local decision-makers cannot anticipate the correct amount of future transfer
payments (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1986: 913).
From a normative perspective, conditional mixed financing of local infrastruc-
ture project is usually justified as a means of internalising positive externalities
(’spillovers’) from infrastructure projects (e.g., Oates, 1999). On the other hand, the
political cost of mixed financing of infrastructure projects is that local political au-
tonomy is undermined. An examplemight illustrate this point: Schmals and Siewert
(1982) elaborate a case study about public transportation in Munich in the 1970s.
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Two alternative plans to improve public transportation existed. The first plan pro-
posed the construction of a network of underground railways to alleviate inner-city
traffic. The majority of city council members favoured this project. The construction
and improvement of a municipal railway system, the second proposal, was backed
by the Bavarian government. Because the Bavarian state government linked an in-
vestment grant with the realisation of the second project, the city council had to
give in. Thus, in this case investment grant prospects had a decisive impact on the
bargaining power between the two governmental levels.
The amount of investment subsidies granted to local infrastructure projects for-
mally depends on external factors e.g. as length of the existing road infrastructure,
expected impacts on the local economy, environmental effects, etc. But as Garlichs
(1986) shows for the case of infrastructure funds for highways, the actual amount of
money is a matter of intense bargaining between all lower level governments and
the higher level. An iron quotas system, which in German politics is frequently the
result of bargaining processes or of even legally settled principles such as unanimity,
is likely to create further distortions for both efficiency and equity targets.
In our political-economy framework we explicitly test a set of political variables
that might influence the allocation of investment subsidies. Given the complexity of
the German federal system we are going to test several distinct sets of hypotheses
that might explain the simultaneous development of both autonomous investments
and grants. This makes it necessary to treat some of the variables as exogeneous –
e.g. demand measures such as the number of cars or the amount of tax revenues
– but narrows the research question down to the triple of efficiency, equity and
political economy arguments of local infrastructure investments in Germany.
3. Hypotheses and structure of the model
Our simultaneous equation model is based on 3 equations, which we label as (i)
production function Qit = f (), (ii) infrastructure investment function INVit = f ()
and (iii) grant allocation function GRANTit = f ().
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3.1. PRODUCTION FUNCTION
To begin with the specification of the production function, we assume that produc-
tion Qit of the manufacturing sector can be described as
Qit = f (t,Kit, Lit,Git), i = 1 . . .N, t = 1 . . . T, (1)
where t denotes time,Qit output, Kit private capital, Lit labour input and Git denotes
the infrastructure stock in city i. In addition, city i’s infrastructure stock Git is defined
as
Git = (1  γ)Gi,t 1 + INVit + GRANTit, (2)
where γ denotes the depreciation rate of public capital, INVit denotes infrastructure
investment, and GRANTit denotes infrastructure investment grants given to city i
from higher-tier governments. Therefore, total infrastructure investment in city i is
defined as INVit + GRANTit.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the manufacturing sector’s pro-
duction function in city i at time t we get
Qit = A0 exp(αtt) L
αL
it K
αK
it G
αG
it , (3)
where αX denotes the elasticity of output Q with respect to input X, and X 2
fL,K,Gg. Dividing by Lit, (3) becomes
qit = A0 exp(αtt) k
αK
it g
αG
it L
α˜L
it , (4)
where lower-case capitals denote variables in terms of the labour input L and α˜L is
defined as α˜L = αL + αK + αG   1.
Note that α˜L will equal zero if returns to scale are constant with respect to all
inputs, i.e., L, K and G; and α˜L   αG will equal zero if returns to scale are constant
with respect to private inputs L and K.
3.2. INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FUNCTION
The increasing importance of investment grants for the realisation of infrastruc-
ture projects suggests to model both parts (grants and autonomous investments)
separately within our simultaneous equation approach. Accordingly, to describe
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the simultaneous determination of investments and grants properly, our model is
based on two additional equations besides the local production function: one which
describes autonomous investment decisions of the cities and one which describes
the level of investment grants the cities receive from higher-tier governments. Fur-
thermore, autonomous investments enter the grants equation and, vice versa, grants
enter the investment equation.
Our hypotheses regarding the determinants of a city’s autonomous infrastructure
spending can be summarised as follows. The first hypothesis we are able to test with
our model is about the relationship between grants and autonomous investments.
Though the majority of grants a city in Germany receives are matching funds, it
nevertheless is an open question whether these matching grants have a complemen-
tary, substitutive or neutral relation to the autonomously financed infrastructure
investments of cities.
The reason is that even in the case of matching grants, the relationship between
grants and investment is not necessarily positive and therefore complementary, since
the local government can reduce its own efforts on financing infrastructure projects
by taking into account the amount of grants it will receive for a project from higher-
tier governments.
Accordingly, grants and autonomous infrastructure spending are only comple-
mentary if grants do not lead to a reduction of financing efforts by local govern-
ments. Therefore, if the relationship between grants and investments is comple-
mentary, a local government which receives grants will autonomously finance more
infrastructure projects than a government which does not receive any grants.
On the other hand, if local governments plan their infrastructure projects irre-
spective on the amount of future matching grants, then the relationship between
autonomous spending and grants can be labelled as neutral. This implies that the
local government will neither reduce nor increase its own financing efforts when
anticipating the matching grants it receives. Consequently, the local government’s
own financing efforts are independent of the amount of matching grants.
The second hypothesis we test with our framework is that local infrastructure
spending should also reflect the preferences of a city’s residents. For instance, cities
with a relatively large number of cars are likely to spend more on transport infras-
tructure.
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The third hypothesis we test is whether a local government’s spending on infras-
tructure is more responsive to increases in intergovernmental grant receipts than it
is to increases in the city’s own tax revenues. The usual finding of various previous
studies on this topic, that local government’s spending is more responsive to inter-
governmental grant receipts, has been dubbed in literature as the ‘flypaper effect’ –
money sticks where it hits (e.g. Oates, 1999; Oulasvirta, 1997).
Moreover, following an idea proposed by Cadot et al. (1999), we test the hypothe-
sis that the number of manufacturing firms is decisive for local infrastructure spend-
ing. The main motivation for this presumption is that particularly manufacturing
firms have sunk investments and therefore a vested interest in the quality andmain-
tenance of the infrastructure where their production is located. Local politicians—on
the other hand—are assumed to be sensitive to the lobbying efforts by business, for
instance in anticipation of potential campaign contributions from firms, or in antici-
pation of the expected loss of trade tax revenues and/or employment opportunities
for their city if firms move to another location.
The fifth hypothesis regarding determinants of local infrastructure investment is
the role of the stability of the government majority in the city council. If local govern-
ments want to buy the support of the local swing voters, one would expect that the
smaller its majority in the city council the larger its spending on local infrastructure
projects.
Finally, the sixth hypothesis we test is the presumption that local governments
might take the expected productivity effects of infrastructure spending on the local
industry into account. Because of this, if local politicians indeed care about the
efficiency of infrastructure projects we would observe a positive effect from the
expected productivity effect of these infrastructure projects on actual the amount
of infrastructure spending. Hence if the expected productivity effect is higher in a
given city, spending of the local government should be higher as well.
3.3. GRANT ALLOCATION FUNCTION
The first hypothesis we can test with our model is the empirical relevance of the
traditional main topic on intergovernmental grant allocation, i.e. the question of
whether or not grant allocation polices are based on efficiency and/or equity crite-
ria. Accordingly, we include in our model both a measure for expected productivity
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effects from infrastructure projects (efficiency) as well as income as a measure for
redistributive concerns (equity).
However, a recent strand of literature discusses alternative politico-economic in-
fluences on intergovernmental grant distribution (e.g. Worthington and Dollery,
1998). For instance, Grossman (1994) hypothesizes that the distribution of grants
is driven by the self-interest of grant-givers. The assumption is that politicians from
higher-level governments are likely to allocate grants for the purpose of enhancing
their reelection chances. In thewords of Grossman, higher governmental level politi-
cians uses grants to ‘purchase political capital’ to be used to influence the voting
decisions of the local residents.
Accordingly, the second hypothesis we test with our model is that party affilia-
tion between higher and lower-tier governments matters for the outcome of grant
allocation. Grossman (1994) states that the political capital is of higher value to
grant-givers if the party affiliation with grant-receivers is the same. However, in the
specific case of German cities, our interpretation why party affiliation matters for
grant-givers is that the identity of political colour shortcuts the bargaining process
between lower and higher-tier governments because it lowers the lobbying cost for
a city government if it has established party contacts to the state government. In
short party affiliation favours certain municipalities by means of party loyalty.
Recently, it has also been suggested in the literature that grants are used as tactical
(electoral politics) instruments for buying support of marginal voters (‘swing voter’
approach, e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Johansson, 1999). Using this framework,
the third hypothesis we test is that cities will receive more grants if they are politi-
cally powerful, i.e. if there is a large number of voters who are indifferent between
the two parties and therefore potentially could be influenced by pork barrel poli-
tics. Following Johansson we proxy political powerfulness as closeness between the
major two blocs, Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
in the last election for the city council. Hence, we expect that if there is evidence of
political powerfulness as a determinant for the distribution of grants, the closer the
last election results between the two major blocs, the larger the amount of grants a
city receives from higher-tier governments.
Finally, the fourth hypothesis we test is that the number of manufacturing firms
is decisive for grant-givers when allocating grants across regions. The reason is
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Table I. Variable Description and Cities
Variable Description
Q Value added, manufacturing sector, million 1980 DM
L Hours worked in manufacturing sector, million hours
K Capital stock in manufacturing, million 1980 DM (from Deitmar, 1993)
G Public infrastructure stock, million 1980 DM, (from Seitz, 1995)
INV Public infrastructure investment, million 1980 DM
GRANT Infrastructure investment grants, million 1980 DM
DEBT Total debt of city, million 1980 DM
TAX Trade tax (‘Gewerbesteuer’) revenues of city i, million 1980 DM
CARS Number of registered motor verhicles (business and private)
NFIRMS Number of manufacturing firms in city i
DMIN Dummy variable equal to 1 when mining industry
is present in city i
PARTISAN Percentage of members in city council with the same political
affiliation as the federal state (‘Bundesland’) government
MAJORITY Percentage difference of the 2 large parties SPD (Social
Democrats ) and CDU (Christian Democratic Union) in last
city council election, values rank transformed from 1
(largest) to 261 (smallest difference)
again the expectation that also higher-tier governments are sensitive to business
interests. If business interests do indeed matter for the outcome of infrastructure
policies, then a priori it is not clear at which level of government lobbying by firms
or business associations takes place. For this reason, the number of manufacturing
firms is included both in the investment and the grant allocation function.
4. Empirical implementation
4.1. DATA
We use a panel data set consisting of 87 German cities and three years (1980, 1986,
1988). Table 4.1 provides a brief overview of the variables used in the analysis.
Most of the data is taken from the ‘Statistical Yearbook of German Cities and
Municipalities’.3 For reasons of data availability, only 87 large cities are included in
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Table II. Cities in Panel
Cities in Panel
1 Aachen 30 Hamm 59 Neustadt/Weinstraße
2 Amberg 31 Hannover 60 Nu¨rnberg
3 Ansbach 32 Heidelberg 61 Oberhausen
4 Aschaffenburg 33 Heilbronn 62 Offenbach/Main
5 Augsburg 34 Herne 63 Oldenburg
6 Baden-Baden 35 Hof 64 Osnabru¨ck
7 Bamberg 36 Ingolstadt 65 Passau
8 Bayreuth 37 Kaiserslautern 66 Pforzheim
9 Bielefeld 38 Karlsruhe 67 Pirmasens
10 Bochum 39 Kassel 68 Regensburg
11 Bonn 40 Kaufbeuren 69 Remscheid
12 Bottrop 41 Kempten/Allga¨u 70 Rosenheim
13 Braunschweig 42 Kiel 71 Saarbru¨cken
14 Coburg 43 Koblenz 72 Salzgitter
15 Darmstadt 44 Ko¨ln 73 Schwabach
16 Delmenhorst 45 Krefeld 74 Schweinfurt
17 Dortmund 46 Landau/Pfalz 75 Solingen
18 Duisburg 47 Landshut 76 Speyer
19 Du¨sseldorf 48 Leverkusen 77 Straubing
20 Erlangen 49 Lu¨beck 78 Stuttgart
21 Essen 50 Ludwigshafen 79 Trier
22 Flensburg 51 Mainz 80 Ulm
23 Frankenthal/Pfalz 52 Mannheim 81 Weiden/Oberpfalz
24 Frankfurt/Main 53 Memmingen 82 Wiesbaden
25 Freiburg/Breisgau 54 Mo¨nchengladbach 83 Wilhelmshaven
26 Fu¨rth 55 Mu¨lheim/Ruhr 84 Worms
27 Gelsenkirchen 56 Mu¨nchen 85 Wuppertal
28 Go¨ttingen 57 Mu¨nster/Westfalen 86 Wu¨rzburg
29 Hagen 58 Neumu¨nster 87 Zweibru¨cken
the sample. All of these cities are predominantly self-administered (autonomous) at
the local level (‘kreisfreie Sta¨dte’). Thus, these cities are highly comparable from a
perspective of fiscal federalism. Table 3 displays the names of cities in our sample.
Output (Q), measured as gross value added of a city’s manufacturing sector,4 is
taken from a joint publication of several German federal states’ statistical offices.5
These data are not available for each year, so that our sample is restricted to three
years, 1980, 1986, and 1988.
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The private capital stock (K) of the manufacturing sector is taken from Deitmar
(1993). It is measured in 1980 prices and has been corrected for the territorial re-
forms that occurred in the 1970s in Germany.6 The infrastructure capital stock (G),
which includes investments both for construction and equipment, is taken from
Seitz (1994) and is also measured in 1980 prices. Transport infrastructure is the
largest part (about 30 percent) of local infrastructure investments (Bach et al., 1994).
Annual investment in infrastructure (INV) has been obtained from the statisti-
cal yearbook mentioned above. From the same source we also have the following
variables: labour input (L), operationalised by the number of working hours in the
manufacturing sector; special grant-in-aid (‘Finanzzuweisungen’) for investments
(GRANT) from ‘Bundesla¨nder’, ‘Bund’ or ERP; several measures of the financial sit-
uation of a city like the cumulated debt (DEBT) or trade taxes revenues (TAX) which
are levied at the local level of cities, the number of (four-wheel) motor vehicles
(private and business) (CARS), and the number of manufacturing firms (NFIRMS)
in a city.
Furthermore, we constructed a political variable denoted as PARTISAN to mea-
sure the congruence between the local city government and the state (‘Bundesland’)
government. It gives the percentage of seats in the city council with the same polit-
ical affiliation as the ‘Bundesland’ government where the city is located. All cities
had at least one city council election during the period 1980 to 1987, some cities had
also 2 city council elections in this period.
In a first step, the variable MAJORITY was constructed as percentage difference
of the 2 major parties, which are the parties SPD and CDU in Germany, from the
results of last city council election. In a second step, in order to smooth the highly
skewed distribution of this variable and also to make it less correlated with the vari-
able PARTISAN 7, a simple monotonic rank transformation has been performed
which assigns the variable MAJORITY rank numbers from 1 for the observation
with the smallest difference in majority to number 261 for the observation with the
largest.
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics of the variables. Note, for instance that
grants are on average about one-third of autonomous investments. Annual infras-
tructure investment undertaken by cities is on average about 3.8 percent of the
existing infrastructure capital stock. The mining industry is present in about 13
12
Table III. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
Q 2099.1 2500.3 119.1 144.3 15718.8
G 2468.8 2834.5 114.8 302.5 18176.1
K 4087.7 5007.6 122.5 252.0 25714.9
L 30.74 29.08 94.6 2.4 168.2
INV 93.6 123.8 132.3 8.1 1040.4
GRANT 32.8 44.7 136.3 0.8 266.1
DEBT 407.9 509.1 124.8 14.3 3066.7
TAX 135.6 210.4 155.2 7.1 1314.6
CARS 88921 91046 102.4 14845 635888
NFIRMS 124.0 101.1 81.5 21 637
DMINING 0.126 0.333 263.4 0 1
PARTISAN 45.9 8.0 17.5 29.0 68.2
MAJORITY 131 75.5 57.6 1 258.5
Total number of observations: 261
percent of cities in our sample. The partisan variable is on average 45.9 percent,
with a minimum of 29.0 and a maximum of 68.2 percent.
Our simultaneous model is based on the following 3 equations for city i, i =
1, . . . ,N, in year t, t = 1980, 1986, 1988.
Production function (5)
lnQit/Lit = α0 + αBL + αt (+) αG ln((Gi,t 1 + INVit + GRANTit)/Lit)
(+) αK ln(Kit/Lit) + α˜L ln(Lit) + αMININGDMINi + u1it,
Local autonomous investment function (6)
INVit/Lit = β0 + βBL + βt + βGRANTGRANTit/Lit + βNFIRMSNFIRMSit
(+) βMAJORMAJORITYit (+) βCARS/LCARSit/Lit
+ βG/LGi,t 1/Lit(+)βPRODαGQit/Gi,t 1 ( ) βDEBT/LDEBTit/Lit
(+) βTAX/LTAXit/Lit + βINCOMEQit/Lit + βMININGDMINi + u2it,
Grant allocation function (7)
GRANTit/Lit = γ0 + γBL + γt + γINV/L INVit/Lit (+) γSWINGVMAJORITYit
(+) γPARTISANPARTISANit ( ) γREDISTRIBQit/Lit
( ) βG/LGi,t 1/Lit (+) γPRODαGQit/Gi,t 1
(+) γNFIRMSNFIRMSit + γMININGDMINi + u3it.
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Equation (5) refers to the production function of the manufacturing sector in city
i described in section 3.1. Equation (6) is derived from the hypothesis discussed in
section 3.2 and describes the autonomous infrastructure investments undertaken
by city i. Equation (7) corresponds to the hypotheses discussed in section 3.3 and
describes investment grants from higher-tier governments which city i receives. We
add a dummy variable DMIN to all equations indicating whether or not the mining
industry is present in city. If a coefficient has an expected sign it is displayed in
parentheses.
From the Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal productivity of infrastruc-
ture capital is defined as ∂Qit/∂Git = αGQit/Git. We include this measure of the
expected productivity effects of infrastructure both in the investment and the grant
allocation function. Since Git also contains current investment INVit, we replaced it
with its lagged value Gi,t 1.
Parameters αBL, βBL and γBL, BL = 1, . . . , 8, refer to fixed effects for the states
(‘Bundesla¨nder’) and αt, βt and γt, t = 1, 2, 3, refer to fixed effects for years.
For disturbances we assume a one-way error-component model with ukit = µki +
υkit for equation k = 1, 2, 3, where µki v I ID(0, σ2kµ) reflects random individual
effects of cities and υkit v I ID(0, σ2kυ) residual errors (Krishnakumar, 1995).
4.2. RESULTS
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 7. Unobserved heterogeneity
of cities is modelled as random error components (EC) for each equation. By mod-
elling the individual effects as random, it is possible to add fixed effects for states
and mining industry to the equations.8 In addition, the endogeneity of Qit, INVit
and GRANTit as right-hand side variables as well as the correlation of errors across
equations is taken into account by using Full-Maximum-Likelihood (FIML) for the
estimation of the simultaneous system.
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the results for the single equation estimation with Er-
ror Components Generalised Least Squares (EC GLS) (e.g., Baltagi, 1995). Columns
2 and 3 contain the results of simultaneous system estimations with Error Compo-
nents FIML.9 The specification of column 3 differ from column 2 in that NFIRMS is
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Table IV. Estimation Results
Nonlinear EC GLS(a) EC FIML(b) EC FIML(b)
Production function: ln(Q/L)it
αBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
αt Fixed effects Fixed effects?? Fixed effects??
α0 0.784 (3.06) 0.828 (4.58) 0.829 (4.59)
αG 0.169 (3.23) 0.170 (4.63) 0.169 (4.60)
αK 0.569 (10.68) 0.555 (14.91) 0.558 (14.95)
α˜L 0.044 (1.55) 0.045 (2.25) 0.043 (2.16)
αMINING -0.497 (-7.12) -0.494 (-10.01) -0.495 (-10.01)
R2(c) 0.814 0.811 0.814
Infrastructure investment function: (INV/L)it
βBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
βt Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
β0 -10.77 (-4.40) -9.77 (-5.10) -10.88 (-5.25)
βGRANT/L 0.530 (5.38) -0.344 (-0.58) -0.422 (-0.96)
βNFIRMS -0.262 (-0.38) 0.223 (0.37) — (—)
βMAJOR -0.002 (-2.00) -0.004 (-2.60) -0.004 (-4.27)
βCARS/L 1.646 (5.36) 1.594 (6.67) 1.733 (6.52)
βG/L 0.014 (4.01) 0.025 (3.41) 0.025 (4.43)
β(d)PROD 3.081 (1.81) 2.252 (1.80) 2.475 (1.94)
βDEBT/L -0.048 (-4.04) -0.046 (-5.11) -0.047 (-4.91)
βTAX/L 0.025 (1.67) 0.026 (2.34) 0.029 (2.42)
βINCOME -6.199 (-1.76) -12.31 (-3.34) -12.80 (-3.73)
βMINING -1.643 (-7.29) -1.61 (-7.86) -1.55 (-7.00)
R2(c) 0.811 0.753 0.743
Grant allocation function: (GRANT/L)it
γBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
γt Fixed effects Fixed effects? Fixed effects?
γ0 -0.709 (-1.62) -0.247 (-0.66) -1.047 (-3.44)
γINV/L 0.171 (5.24) 0.018 (0.27) 0.133 (2.23)
γSWINGV -0.001 (-2.30) -0.002 (-3.83) — (—)
γPARTISAN 0.014 (2.34) 0.013 (2.91) 0.020 (5.13)
γREDISTRIB -3.758 (-1.95) -4.707 (-2.97) -5.321 (-3.52)
γG/L 0.009 (6.25) 0.013 (7.29) 0.011 (6.73)
γ(d)PROD 0.236 (0.33) -0.121 (-0.22) 0.317 (0.61)
γ(d)NFIRMS 0.498 (1.25) 0.388 (1.28) 0.273 (0.97)
γMINING 0.293 (2.00) 0.064 (0.46) 0.281 (2.28)
R2(c) 0.738 0.715 0.730
Notes: t-values in parentheses, ???10 %, ??5 %, ??? 1 % significant.
EC=Error Components Model, (a) Single Equation, (b) Simultaneous System.
(c) Based on GLS residuals, not bounded [0,1],(d) [10-3].
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excluded from the investment equation and MAJORITY is excluded from the grant
equation.
Overall, the fit of the 3 equations is remarkable high with R2 ranging between
0.71 and 0.81. Turning first to the results for the production function, we find that
local public capital is a productive input for local manufacturing. The estimated
coefficient which is the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure is positive
and statistically significant with a value of about 0.17. This coefficient is remarkably
stable with respect to the different estimation methods and specifications. As the es-
timates for the infrastructure coefficient do not vary much between single equation
and simultaneous equation estimation, the econometric evidence for an endogeneity
of infrastructure capital in the production function is weak. This can be attributed
to the fact that infrastructure investment is relatively small compared to the infras-
tructure stock, thus replacing investment with predicted values from instrumental
variables therefore has only a small impact on the estimated parameter for Git. The
ratio of output to public infrastructure stock is on average about 0.95, which implies
a rate of return of infrastructure of about 16 percent.
In addition, private capital is significant with a value of about 0.55. The ratio of
output to private capital stock is on average about 0.6, which implies a rate of return
of private manufacturing capital of about 33 percent. From the value of t-statistic for
labour input L, it can be infered that for the single-equation estimation, constant
returns are not rejected at a 10 percent level, whereas for the simultaneous equation
estimations constant returns to scale are rejected at a 5 percent level. Cities where
mining industry is located have a lower expected output.
Turning second to the results for the infrastructure investment function, we find
that from the positive and significant coefficient for GRANT/L in the first column
it appears as if grants and local public investments are complementary, i.e. grants
stimulate further infrastructure projects. However, if the endogeneity of grants is
taken into account by applying simultaneous system estimation methods, it turns
out that the relationship between grants and local public investments appear to be
neutral. Thus, the receipt of future grants is not taken into account by local govern-
ments when fixing their amount of autonomous spending. Assessing this result, the
‘good news’ is that cities do not reduce their own efforts in anticipating the receipt
of future matching grants from higher-tier governments. The ‘bad news’ from this
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result is that cities do not increase their own spending efforts even with the prospect
of matching grants for infrastructure projects. Thus, the incentive created by grants
for expanding cities’ own infrastructure investments is rather low.
With regard to the second hypothesis that local infrastructure spending should
also reflect preferences and demand of cities’ residents and business, we find that
the coefficient of CARS/L, which is measured as number of (four-wheel) motor
vehicles (business and private) per labour, is positive and highly significant. Thus,
cities with a high intensity of cars do indeed invest more in infrastructure.
Turning to the economic factors thatmight determine a city’s infrastructure spend-
ing, we find that the higher the debt (DEBT/L) of a city, the lower its infrastructure
spending. This corroborates our initial presumption that the financial room to ma-
noeuvre is decisive for local infrastructure investments. On the other hand, local
infrastructure spending is higher the higher the trade tax revenues of a city. Thus, in
our case there is no evidence of the ‘flypaper’ effect described above.
Furthermore, we find that labour productivity (Q/L) from the manufacturing
sector is negatively related to infrastructure spending. Thus, cities where labour
productivity of manufacturing is lower spend more on infrastructure. This evidence
turns out to be even stronger if the endogeneity of output Q and GRANTS is taken
into account in columns 2 and 3. At a first glance, this finding suggests some kind of
catching-up in infrastructure spending of economically underdeveloped cities. We
also conclude from this finding that the argument of reverse causality, meaning in
our case that more prosperous cities are likely to spend more on infrastructure, is
empirically not supported.
However, we also find that the coefficient for infrastructure endowment (G/L)
is positive and significant. This does not support the expectation of catching-up of
economically weak cities, because cities which already have a good infrastructure
endowment spend more than cities with a poor infrastructure endowment. Hence,
at least for our sample, no convergence of cities’ infrastructure endowments can be
expected in the long-run.
In addition, expected productivity effects from infrastructure (βPROD) appear to
matter for local investments. However, the statistical reliability of this result is rela-
tively weak at a 10 percent significance level.
Finally, turning to the political-economy determinants of infrastructure invest-
ment we find that the number of manufacturing firms (βNFIRMS) is not decisive for
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local infrastructure spending. However, this result should not be interpreted as
evidence of non-existence of lobbying efforts of business at the local level.10 The
reason is the difficulty to find plausible and observable measures for the lobbying
efforts of firms. For instance, it can be argued that the number of manufacturing
firms is not an adequate proxy for potential lobbying strength of business, since
one dominating big firm might have a stronger influence on policy decisions than
many small firms. For this reason, we also tried a dummy variable in our regressions
indicating whether one or more headquarters of large stock companies are located
in a city. However, this alternative measure of potential lobbying power turned out
to be insignificant as well.
On the other hand, we find that the size of government majority of the govern-
ment in the city council is decisive for infrastructure spending. However, since the
coefficient βMAJOR is negative, it implies that spending is higher the bigger the major-
ity of the local government. As a consequence, this evidence does not support the
hypothesis that local governments spend more on infrastructure if the majority is
more unstable. One explanation for the positive coefficient βMAJOR is that controver-
sial infrastructure projects are likely to be prevented by the opposition in city council
if the majority of the government is small. Furthermore, the larger MAJORITY the
less likely it is that a city’s government is formed on the basis of a party coalition.
A similar finding holds also for the grant equation. The coefficient γSWINGV is neg-
ative and significant but as before, for the support of the swing voter hypothesis a
positive coefficient is expected. This result means that cities where the majority of
local government is small (i.e. more unstable) receive less grants whereas the swing
voter hypothesis predicts that these cities will receive more grants in order to buy
the support of swing voters. Thus, the negative coefficient for γSWINGV corresponds to
the findings for βMAJOR in the investment equation that cities where the government
majority is more stable spend more on infrastructure and receive more grants.
Moreover, the estimate for the partisan variable (PARTISAN) is significant, which
means that the expected level of grants is higher the larger the correspondence
of political affiliation between the local city council and the state (‘Bundesland’)
government. At the mean data points, one percentage point increase in political af-
filiation correspondence between the city and the state government gives on average
1.25 percent more investment grants. This is a considerable amount with regard to
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the fact that political affiliation in our sample varies from 29.0 to 68.2 percent. This
finding is as an indication that self-interests of grant-givers do indeed matter for
the allocation of grants. Local governments which have a higher ‘political capital’
(in terms of votes) to sell, are rewarded ‘with a larger slice of the cake’. Thus, party
affiliation of government is used as a shortcut for ideology, which allows politicians
to target grants to those cities with the highest payoff.
Turning to the determinants of grant distribution that are not tactically but benev-
olently motivated, the negative and significant coefficient γREDISTRIB indicates that re-
distributive concerns are important. Hence, the lower the labour productivity (Q/L)
of manufacturing in a city (i.e. the more economically underdeveloped it is) the
more grants it gets. On the other hand in contrast to what is expected, cities which
already have a good endowment with infrastructure (i.e. a high infrastructure in-
tensity G/L) get more grants. If infrastructure intensity G/L is also related to the
economic development of a city, we would expect a negative sign.
Expected productivity effects (γPROD) of infrastructure investment appear not to
matter for the allocation of investment grants. This can be explained by the fact
that because investment grant decisions of state governments in Germany are based
on consensus with all local level governments, this approach is prone to produce
decisions that carefully skirt all areas of conflict. In terms of economic efficiency, the
bargaining process will often lead to outcomes which are from a welfare perspec-
tive not optimal, so there is no guarantee that the money is being put to its most
productive use.
Finally, for the specification in column 3 of Table 7 we find that investments have
a positive impact on grants. The question arises whether this contradicts the finding
for the investment function where no effect of grants on investments is found. Our
explanation for this evidence is that local governments on the one hand are not
responsive to changes in the amount of grants from higher-tier governments when
fixing their level of autonomous investment spending, but higher-tier governments
on the other hand are responsive to increased autonomous investment spending.
This probably simply reflects the fact that the relation between local investments
andmatching grants is relatively fixed, i.e. if autonomous spending increases, grants
increase as well. The underlying mechanism is that autonomous investments deter-
mine the amount of grants, but grants do not determine the amount of autonomous
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investment spending. In addition, it is also interesting to note that the coefficient
γINV/L with a value of 0.133 is significantly lower than one could expect from the
average relation between matching grants and investments in our sample of 0.333.
Once other factors that explain the distribution of grants are taken into account,
the coefficient of investments decreases significantly. Finally, cities where mining
industry is present spend less on infrastructure investment but receive on average
more grants.
5. Summary and Conclusions
In this study we estimated a system of equations comprising a production function,
an infrastructure investment function and an investment grant function using a
panel data set of large German cities. Overall, our empirical results highlight the
significance of political factors both for local infrastructure spending and for the
intergovernmental distribution of grants.
Several key empirical findings emerge from our analysis (i) public capital is a
significant input for local production (ii) cities where the city council’s majority has
the same political affiliation as the state (‘Bundesland’) government receive more
grants (iii) cities where ‘marginal voters’ are decisive for the outcome of city council
elections neither spend more on public infrastructure nor receive more investment
grants from higher level governments, but the larger the government majority the
higher the spending (iv) redistributive concerns of higher-tier governments matter
for the allocation of grants, whereas efficiency considerations (i.e. putting themoney
to its most productive use) appear to be less important.
From a normative perspective our findings support the view that pork barrel
politics are indeed important determinants for intergovernmental grant allocation
which might give rise to policy outcomes that depart substantially from optimal
policies that maximise social welfare.
Since politics is an important factor for the allocation of infrastructure invest-
ments, a few tentative conclusions about the peculiarities of German fiscal federal-
ism arise. Firstly, in comparison with both France (Cadot et al., 1999) and the U.S.
(Grossman, 1994) the political influence of interest groups is less visible in Germany.
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Current models of political economy seem to have both theoretical and empiri-
cal shortcomings in explaining the German case. Secondly, the fact that inspite of
empirical evidence for equity targets there seems to be no trend toward long-term
convergence suggests a trade-off in the institutional system between the consensus
principle on the one hand, and the constitutional commitment toward uniformity
of living conditions. Furthermore, the fact that the swing voter prediction performs
rather poorly in our empirical model whereas party affiliation has some explanatory
power may imply that grants are more of a means of state governments to reward
their political constituencies than a tactical instrument to gain elections in heavily
contested areas. This is corroborated by the positive relationship between stability
of local governments and the amount of grants they receive.
Finally, many studies on the productivity effects of public capital have treated
infrastructure as an exogenous factor of production and neglected the politico-eco-
nomic factors that shape infrastructure policy. However, the good news from our
study is that evidence of an endogeneity bias of infrastructure capital estimates in
a production function framework as well as evidence of reverse causality running
from output to infrastructure investments is weak.
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Notes
1 A good point in case are the so-called GVFG-funds of the central government. Although the
central government formally exercises the task of allocating resources to projects, over 80 percent of
the allocation is decided by the federal states. The latter are also in charge of the implementation and
monitoring of projects.
2 There are alternative views that state that the growing dependence on investment grants might
be due to endogenous institutional change (Inman, 1988: 56). But in the German case ’the rules of the
game’ have been relatively stable throughout the 80s.
3 Original title: ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Sta¨dte und Gemeinden’.
4 This includes also the mining industries.
5 ‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder, Bruttowertscho¨pfung der kreisfreien Sta¨d-
te, der Landkreise und der Arbeitsmarktregionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Heft 26,
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 1995.
6 For further details, see Deitmar (1993).
7 The correlation between MAJORITY without and MAJORITY with rank transformation is -
0.97. The correlation between MAJORITY without rank transformation and PARTY is 0.47, the
correlation between MAJORITY with rank transformation and PARTY is -0.40.
8 This would not be possible if the error components were modelled as fixed. The main reason,
however, why we model unobserved heterogeneity of cities as random is that (i) the random effects
model is more parsimonious in parameters (ii) more importantly, our sample does not have sufficient
‘within’ variation, which is due to the fact that there are only 3 distinct years of observation for each
city.
9 The estimations have been carried out using the PROC MODEL procedure in SAS V8.
10 Numerous anecdotal evidence on this can be found in newspapers.
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